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Many traditional macroeconomic models do not have determinate predictions
for the path of inﬂation: even for a given speciﬁcation of money supplies, many
paths of inﬂation are consistent with equilibrium. According to the ﬁscal theory
of the price level, ﬁscal policy can be used to select which of these many paths
actually occur. This article explains the ﬁscal theory of the price level and
discusses its empirical and policy implications. The article argues that the theory
is equivalent to giving the government an ability to choose among equilibria.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.How can governments inﬂuence inﬂation rates? Econo-
mists’ standard answer is that the central bank controls
the inﬂation rate through its ability to control the money
supply. In particular, if output grows at γ percent per
year and the money supply grows at µ percent per year,
then, at least over sufficiently long periods of time,
prices will grow at (µ−γ) percent per year. Simply put,
the inﬂation rate is determined by the change in the rel-
ative scarcities of money and goods.
Unfortunately, there is a large hole in this simple, stat-
ic reasoning. How much money a household wants to
hold today depends crucially on that household’s beliefs
about future inﬂation. As it turns out, this dependence of
current money demand on beliefs about future inﬂation
creates the possibility of a large number of equilibrium
paths of inﬂation rates, besides the one in which prices
grow at (µ−γ) percent. (See Obstfeld and Rogoff 1983,
for example.) Thus, control of the money supply alone is
not sufficient to pin down the time path of the inﬂation
rate.
This analysis suggests the following important ques-
tion: Can the government use some other policy instru-
ment, such as taxes or debt policy, in conjunction with
monetary policy to determine the time path of the inﬂa-
tion rate? In an important recent paper, Woodford (1995)
proposes a new theory of price determination, the ﬁscal
theory of the price level. He argues that the government’s
choice of how to ﬁnance its debt plays a crucial role in
the determination of the time path of the inﬂation rate.
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In this article, we explain this theory. We make three
main points. First, we show that according to Wood-
ford’s (1995) theory, ﬁscal policy affects inﬂation rates if
and only if the government can behave in a fundamen-
tally different way from households. Households must
satisfy intertemporal budget constraints, no matter what
price paths they face. Woodford (1995) argues that the
government does not face this same requirement; the
government can follow non-Ricardian ﬁscal policies un-
der which the intertemporal budget constraint is satisﬁed
for some, but not all, price paths. Following Woodford
(1995), we show that ﬁscal policy can affect inﬂation
rates if and only if the government can use non-Ricar-
dian policies.
Why can the government inﬂuence inﬂation rates
when it uses non-Ricardian policies? We show that if
the government’s intertemporal budget constraint is not
satisﬁed for a price path, then that price path cannot be
an equilibrium (because such a path is inconsistent with
market-clearing and household optimality). Hence, the
government can reject any price path as an equilibrium
by guaranteeing that its intertemporal budget constraint
is not satisﬁed along that price path.
Our second point concerns a natural question: Can
the government implement non-Ricardian policies, even
though households cannot? We argue that this question
cannot be answered using data. Whether a ﬁscal policy
is non-Ricardian concerns the government’s behavior at
unobserved price paths; therefore, such a determination
is nontestable. Fundamentally, then, whether the govern-
ment can follow a non-Ricardian policy is a religious,
not a scientiﬁc, question.
Finally, we demonstrate that the predictions of a spe-
ciﬁc popular non-Ricardian ﬁscal policy for inﬂation are
highly counterintuitive. In particular, we show that under
this non-Ricardian policy, one-time decreases in the mon-
ey supply can lead to hyperinﬂations. This is in stark con-
trast to the usual monetarist intuition under which one-
time decreases in the money supply have no effect on
long-run inﬂation rates.
We proceed in three parts. First, we show that stan-
dard monetary models have an inﬁnite number of pre-
dictions for the time path of inﬂation rates. Our analysis
closely follows that of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983). Next,
we demonstrate how the ﬁscal theory of the price level
serves to shrink the set of predictions by allowing the
government to use non-Ricardian policies. Finally, we
argue that the ﬁscal theory is not falsiﬁable, and we con-
sider its implications for the consequences of a once-and-
for-all decrease in the money supply.
On the Indeterminacy of Monetary Equilibria
In this section, we present an example economy, origi-
nally due to Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983), that shows how
standard monetary models have a continuum of equilib-
rium time paths for the inﬂation rate.
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In our example economy, time is discrete and inﬁnite.
There is a continuum of identical households. The house-
holds are initially endowed with M−1 dollars and with a
constant stream of y perishable consumption goods. In
our example, we assume that the money supply does not
change over time.
In each period, households exchange money, nominal
bonds, and consumption in a competitive market. In this
market, households face a sequence of ﬂow budget con-
straints (for all t ≥ 0) of the following form:
(1) Ptct + Mt + Bt ≤ Mt−1 + Rt−1Bt−1 + Pty
with ct and Mt ≥ 0, B−1 =0 ,a n dM−1 given. In this mar-
ket, ct is the amount of consumption goods consumed by
the household in period t, Mt is the amount of dollars
held by the household at the end of period t, Bt is the
amount of the nominal bonds held by the household at
the end of period t, Rt is the number of dollars a bond
pays in period t + 1, and Pt is the price of consumption
in terms of dollars in period t. (Here and throughout the
article, uppercase letters refer to nominal variables, and
lowercase letters to real variables.)
Households also face a borrowing condition that for
all t ≥ 0,









In words, this condition requires that the household’s
wealth at the end of period t, including the present value
of its income stream, be nonnegative. This condition
eliminates Ponzi schemes (or ﬁnancing unlimited con-
sumption by running Bt to negative inﬁnity).
If Pt > 0 for all t, then the price of a period t dollar






0Rs. Given this, the
formulation above of a household’s budget set as a se-
quence of ﬂow budget constraints (1) and a borrowing
condition (2) is equivalent to the perhaps more familiar
formulation of a consumer’s budget set as one in which
the value of expenditures in terms of some numeraire
good equals the value of resources in terms of that same
numeraire. That is, constraint (1) and condition (2) de-ﬁne the same set of feasible consumption and money


















0Rs) + R−1B−1 + M−1.
Here, the left side is the value of the household’s net
purchases of money and the household’s consumption,
while the right side is the value (in terms of period 0
money) of the household’s endowment stream.
Each household has the same preferences over streams





Here, 0 < β < 1. Also, the utility functions over consump-
tion and real balances, u and v, are assumed twice dif-
ferentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave, with
u′(0) = ∞.
The household seeks to maximize this objective func-
tion, subject to equations (1) and (2). If the borrowing
condition (2) ever binds, the household must have ct =0
in all future periods; therefore, the assumption that u′(0) =
∞ ensures that (2) never binds.
An equilibrium is a sequence {Pt,Rt}
∞
t=0 of nominal
prices and interest rates such that, given this sequence,
households ﬁnd it optimal to choose to hold the supply
M−1 of dollars and eat y of the consumption goods in
each period (and thus set Bt = 0 each period). Examina-
tion of the ﬁrst-order conditions delivers that any posi-
tive sequence {Pt,Rt}
∞
t=0 is an equilibrium if and only if
condition (3) holds with equality and for all t ≥ 0,
(5) v′(M−1/Pt)=u′(y)[1−1/Rt]
(6) Rt = (1/β)(Pt+1/Pt).
The present-value budget condition (3) holding with
equality is equivalent to the ﬂow budget constraint (1)
holding with equality and the limiting condition







In this economy, output does not grow and money
does not grow. Hence, the standard, static thinking about
inﬂation would say that nominal prices should not grow.
There is indeed an equilibrium of this form. In this equi-
librium, for all t,
(8) Pt = P
*
(9) Rt =1 / β
(10) v′(M−1/P
*)=( 1 −β)u′(y).
(Note that in this equilibrium, the value of money P
* is
inversely proportional to the supply of money M−1.)
3
Under a wide variety of assumptions about u and v,
however, there is a continuum of other equilibria. To see
this, solve equation (5) for Pt+1 after imposing equation
(6), yielding
(11) Pt+1 = βPt[1 −(v′(M−1/Pt)/u′(y))]
−1.
If we assume that
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(12) u(c) = log(c)
(13) v(M/P) = log(y+M/P)
we have the following difference equation:
(14) Pt+1 = βPt[ 1+( Pty/M−1)].
The accompanying chart displays this function. It has
a ﬁxed point at zero, and P
* = [(1−β)/β](M−1/y). Further,
for all Pt > P
*,P t+1 > Pt; thus, Pt becomes arbitrarily
large (or money becomes valueless). For any P0 > P*,
the price path constructed in this manner [along with
Rt = (1/β)(Pt+1/Pt)] is an equilibrium. (If P0 < P
*, equa-
tion (14) implies that prices go to zero, or money be-
comes inﬁnitely valuable. Given this, however, condition
(7) is violated; thus, these paths are not equilibria.)
Thus, given our assumption about household prefer-
ences, there is a continuum of equilibria in this economy.
We can easily show that this result can be obtained for ar-
bitrary speciﬁcations of the endowment process and for
arbitrary growth in the money supply. Nor is this result
special to money-in-the-utility-function models. The mul-
tiplicity of equilibria also occurs in cash-in-advance mod-
els (Wilson 1979) and in cash-credit models (Woodford
1994).
This multiplicity of equilibria should not be surpris-
ing. Unlike a stock which pays dividends or a piece of
art which the owner can enjoy looking at, money in this
economy is a purely speculative asset. In every period, a
household’s utility from holding money depends only on
how much other households value money relative to the
consumption good. (That is, the household values real, as
opposed to nominal, balances.) The equilibria in which
P0 > P
* (and thus Pt goes to inﬁnity) are essentially spec-
ulative hyperinﬂations. Even though every household un-
derstands that money is becoming valueless, households
still hold positive but shrinking real balances because of
the utility those real balances bring.
Fiscal Policy and Equilibrium
In this section, we introduce ﬁscal policy into our exam-
ple economy. We show that various formulations of ﬁs-
cal policy have important consequences for the ability of
the government to inﬂuence inﬂation.
Formulating Fiscal Policy
First, we introduce a government into our economy,
along with the elements of ﬁscal policy. For simplicity,
and because it makes no difference in understanding the
issues we address, we assume that government spending,
in real terms, is constant at the level g. Suppose house-
holds are initially endowed with R−1B−1 dollars of nomi-
nal government debt (where R−1B−1 can be negative). At
the beginning of each period t, the government imposes
lump-sum taxes τt (again, τt can be negative), retires its
existing debt, issues new debt, and prints new money.
Formally, the households now face a sequence of ﬂow
budget constraints of the following form:
(15) Ptct + Mt + Bt ≤ Mt−1 + Rt−1Bt−1 + Pt(y−τt)with ct and Mt ≥ 0 and with R−1B−1 and M−1 given.
Again, to ensure that the household does not keep bor-
rowing without limit, we impose the following borrow-
ing condition for all t ≥ 0:









This condition, again, never binds at a household’s opti-
mum.
The key now is how we specify government ﬁscal
policy.
DEFINITION. A policy Π is a function that maps positive
price sequences P ={ Pt}
∞
t=0 into sets of sequences
(τ,R,B,M)={ τt,Rt,Bt,Mt}
∞
t=0 such that if (τ,R,B,M)
∈Π (P), then for all t,
(17) Ptτt + Bt + Mt = Ptg + Rt−1Bt−1 + Mt−1.
Thus, a government policy speciﬁes a set of possible
tax, nominal interest rate, debt, and money supply
sequences for each possible price sequence with a re-
striction that these sequences must satisfy a ﬂow budget
constraint. (Note that M−1 and R−1B−1 are not under the
control of the government.) We emphasize that a policy
is a set of sequences (τ,R,B,M) for each price sequence
P as opposed to a single sequence for each P because a
government can choose to let an element of (τt,Rt,Bt,Mt)
be unspeciﬁed. For instance, a government can decide
to let the “market” determine the nominal return on
bonds Rt, the quantity of bonds Bt, or the money supply
Mt.
We purposely use a quite general deﬁnition of poli-
cy. For instance, in an approach popularized by Ramsey
(1927) [and followed up by Diamond and Mirrlees
(1971a, b), Lucas and Stokey (1983), and Chari and
Kehoe (1990)], a policy would be simply a sequence of
tax rates and money supplies. Putting such a policy in
our framework would involve leaving nominal interest
rates and bonds unspeciﬁed and having the same se-
quence of tax rates and money supplies for all price se-
quences. A policy could instead involve complicated
feedback rules from prices to money supplies or taxes.
Further, a policy could have the government explicitly
set the nominal interest rate, either as simply an exoge-
nous sequence or through some feedback rule from
prices to nominal interest rates. Our formulation allows
all of these possibilities. Our formulation of policy does
not allow explicit price-setting of the consumption good
by the government. This restriction is in keeping with
the spirit of the ﬁscal theory of the price level, which
takes as given that the government can inﬂuence the
price level only indirectly through monetary and ﬁscal
policy.
Given our notion of policy and given that ct = y − g
for all t from the resource constraint, an equilibrium in
this economy is a sequence {Pt,τt,Rt,Bt,Mt}
∞
t=0 such that
the following ﬁve conditions hold:
(18) v′(Mt/Pt)=u′(y−g)[1−1/Rt]
(19) Rt = (1/β)(Pt+1/Pt)







(21) Pt(y−g)+Bt + Mt = Pt(y−τt)+Rt−1Bt−1 + Mt−1
(22) (τ,R,B,M)i nΠ(P).
The ﬁrst two conditions are from the household’s ﬁrst-
order conditions. The next requirement is the house-
hold’s transversality condition. The fourth condition says
that the household’s ﬂow budget constraint is satisﬁed
with equality. The ﬁnal condition requires that the gov-
ernment follow its policy Π.
As before, if the limiting condition on household
wealth is satisﬁed and the sequence of household bud-



















0Rs] + R−1B−1 + M−1
holds with equality (and vice versa).
Two Types of Government Policy
What types of policy should economists be willing to
consider? By requiring policies to satisfy a government’s
ﬂow budget constraint, we have already imposed an
opinion that those policies which violate such a con-
straint are nonsensical. Whether this is the only require-
ment we need to impose on policy is at the heart of un-
derstanding the ﬁscal theory of the price level. Here and
in the next subsection, we formally consider the implica-
tions of further requiring that a policy always balance the
government’s budget in the “long run.” We argue that
imposing such a restriction makes ﬁscal policy, in an im-
portant sense, irrelevant.
The preceding formalization of policy speciﬁes a set
of possible actions for every speciﬁcation of prices in
this economy. Thus, a policy looks a lot like a con-
sumer’s excess demand correspondence in neoclassical
economics. But there is a key difference: a demand
correspondence must satisfy the requirement that for all
prices, the value of a consumer’s excess demand is ze-
ro. In this case, this implies that a consumer’si n ﬁnite-
period budget constraint holds with equality. Following
Woodford (1995), we use the term Ricardian to refer to
policies that satisfy an equivalent restriction for the gov-
ernment as well.
To deﬁne the notion of a Ricardian policy, we must
ﬁrst introduce an inﬁnite-horizon budget constraint for
the government. Analogous to the household’s, the gov-



























requires that the present discounted value of government
revenues (including seigniorage) be at least as large as
the government’s obligations. Like the household’s, the
government’si n ﬁnite-horizon budget constraint holds
with equality if and only if the government’s ﬂow bud-
get constraint holds with equality and the limiting condi-
tion







We say a policy Π is Ricardian if for all P and for
all (τ,R,B,M)i nΠ(P), the government’si n ﬁnite-horizon
budget constraint is satisﬁed with equality. Equivalently,
a policy Π is Ricardian if and only if for all P and for
all (τ,R,B,M)i nΠ(P), condition (25) holds. This latter
formulation of Ricardian policy will be more convenient
for some purposes.
What is an example of a Ricardian policy? Suppose
that for all P, (τ,R,B,M)i si nΠ(P) if and only if for all t,
(26) τt =( Rt−1−γ)(Bt−1/Pt)+g, γ <1
(27) Rt ≥ 1+η, η >0
(28) Bt = γ
tB−1
(29) Mt = M−1.
Under this policy, the government always collects
enough in taxes to pay g, its interest obligations, and
fraction (1−γ) of its nominal debt. (If B−1 is negative,
then the government collects less than g in taxes and
uses the interest on its net assets to fund g.) Because the
government’s debt is shrinking over time, the policy is
Ricardian.
What is an example of a non-Ricardian policy? Sup-
pose that for an arbitrary P, (τ,R,B,M)i si nΠ(P)i fa n d
only if for all t,
(30) τt = g + ε, ε >0
(31) Rt ≥ 1+η, η >0
(32) Bt = Rt−1Bt−1 − εPt
(33) Mt = M−1.
Under this policy, the government rolls over all but εPt
of its initial debt in every period. To see that this policy
is not Ricardian, suppose that Pt = ˆ P and Rt =1 / β for
all t. Then the government’si n ﬁnite-horizon budget con-
straint can only be satisﬁed if
(34) R−1B−1 = ε ˆ P/(1−β).
Only one value of ˆ P satisﬁes equation (34). Hence, the
policy is not Ricardian, because the inﬁnite-horizon bud-
get constraint is not satisﬁed for all price level sequences.
Equilibrium With Ricardian and
Non-Ricardian Fiscal Policies
In this subsection, we ﬁrst consider the set of equilibri-
um prices under the two example policies. We show
that under our example Ricardian policy (and under Ri-
cardian policies in general), ﬁscal policy is irrelevant.
We then show precisely how ﬁscal policy can determine
prices when non-Ricardian policies are allowed.
Ricardian Policy
Recall our earlier example policy which speciﬁes that for
all P, (τ,R,B,M)i si nΠ(P) if and only if for all t,
(35) τt =( Rt−1−γ)(Bt−1/Pt)+g, γ <1
(36) Rt ≥ 1+η, η >0
(37) Bt = γ
tB−1
(38) Mt = M−1.
As in our earlier example, we assume that
(39) u(c) = log(c)
(40) v(M/P) = log(y−g+M/P).
We can use our reasoning of the preceding section to
show that under our example Ricardian policy, any price
sequence of the form





(43) Pt+1 = βPt[1 + Pt(y−g)/M−1]
is an equilibrium price sequence regardless of the initial
debt R−1B−1. We can see this by noting that any such se-
quence, together with the sequences deﬁned by the poli-
cy, as well as
(44) Rt = (1/β)(Pt+1/Pt)
satisfy the equilibrium conditions.
Thus, under the Ricardian policy, all of the equilibri-
um price sequences derived earlier are still equilibria.
This is an example of a much more general principle:
Every Ricardian policy which speciﬁes the same se-
quence of money supplies has the same set of equilibri-
um price sequences. The initial government debt and the
timing of taxes is, in this important sense, irrelevant.
(That is, Ricardian equivalence holds.) The initial gov-
ernment debt held by households, R−1B−1, does not affect
real household wealth because the present value of taxes
(over and above g) must always equal it. To paraphrase
Barro (1974), government bonds are not net wealth and
thus affect nothing of interest.
Non-Ricardian Policy
Now suppose that the government follows the policy Π
such that (τ,R,B,M)i si nΠ(P) if and only if for all t,
(45) τt = g + ε, ε >0
(46) Rt ≥ 1+η, η >0
(47) Bt = Rt−1Bt−1 − εPt
(48) Mt = M−1.
Assume, as before, that
(49) u(c) = log(c)
(50) v(M/P) = log(y−g+M/P).
Again, pick an arbitrary P0 ≥ P
*, and consider the se-
quence Pt deﬁned recursively by the household’s ﬁrst-
order condition:
(51) Pt+1 = βPt[1 + Pt(y−g)/M−1].Under the above Ricardian policy, this sequence is an
equilibrium for any choice of P0 ≥ P
*. However, under
the non-Ricardian policy, such a sequence is an equi-
librium for only one possible P0. To see this, note that
household optimization requires that for all price se-
quences P, the household’si n ﬁnite-period budget con-


















0Rs] + R−1B−1 + M−1.
Imposing the equilibrium condition ct = y − g and re-
arranging equation (52) delivers the government budget



























It is important to note that while equation (53) was in-
troduced in the discussion of Ricardian policies as a
constraint on government policy (for all price sequences
P), it has been separately derived as an equilibrium con-
dition using only household optimization and market-
clearing.
5 Further imposing the non-Ricardian policy










as an equilibrium condition. Finally, imposing the equi-
librium condition that Rt = (1/β)(Pt+1/Pt) implies
(55) R−1B−1/P0 = ε/(1−β)
as an equilibrium condition. Here, the left side is the real
period 0 value of the initial government debt and the
right side is the present value of the government’s real
surpluses. If R−1B−1 is positive, a unique P0 is pinned
down. If this unique P0 ≥ P
*, then a unique equilibrium
is selected from the set of equilibria generated by our
example Ricardian policy.
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More generally, for a policy to be non-Ricardian, by
deﬁnition, price sequences P must exist for which the
government’si n ﬁnite-period budget constraint does not
hold with equality. Since we derived from household op-
timization and goods market-clearing that for any equi-
librium price sequence, the government’si n ﬁnite-period
budget constraint must hold, these price sequences are
immediately rejected as equilibria.
Thus, at its very core, a non-Ricardian policy is an
equilibrium rejection device. To eliminate all equilibria,
choose a policy for which the government’si n ﬁnite-
period budget constraint is violated under all price se-
quences P. To select a particular equilibrium (or subset
of equilibria) of a Ricardian policy, specify that the gov-
ernment act the way it would under the Ricardian policy
for that particular price sequence (or subset of sequenc-
es) and that it act in a way which violates its inﬁnite-
period budget constraint for all other price sequences.
Because it is the speciﬁcation of government ﬁscal poli-
cy which eliminates some price sequences as potential
equilibria, in some sense, it is this policy which “causes”
the remaining price sequences to be candidate equilibria.




In this section, we consider the empirical implications, or
testability, of the ﬁscal theory of the price level. To this
end, consider data on sequences (P,M,B,y,g,τ). (We
could even allow these sequences to be inﬁnite.) The
ﬁscal theory is of interest only if we believe that gov-
ernments sometimes follow non-Ricardian policies. Can
we identify whether these data were generated by a Ri-
cardian or non-Ricardian policy? If the data ﬁt our deﬁ-
nition of an equilibrium, the answer is simply no. The
distinction between Ricardian and non-Ricardian policies
is precisely over how the government would have acted
for price sequences other than P. A non-Ricardian policy
implies that the government would have acted in a way
in which it didn’t satisfy its inﬁnite-period budget con-
straint with equality. Would it have? We cannot know
because we only see how it acted under P. The ﬁscal
theory of the price level is not falsiﬁable. (Arguments
similar to this are in Cochrane 1999.)
However, a joint hypothesis, such as that the govern-
ment has a particular class of desired outcomes and uses
non-Ricardian policies to achieve them, is falsiﬁable. For
instance, we could assert that governments use non-
Ricardian policies to select the stationary equilibria asso-
ciated with stationary policies, and then we could see if
governments with stationary monetary policies tend to
have stationary prices. The difficulty with this approach
is that while such a joint hypothesis is falsiﬁable, it can’t
be distinguished from any other equilibrium selection de-
vice. For instance, we could hypothesize that when sta-
tionary equilibria exist, they are the equilibria that occur
simply because stationarity is the natural focal point of
beliefs. If our tests do not reject stationarity, no further
tests will be able to say whether stationary price paths
occur because of non-Ricardian policies or some other
reason.
Whether a government is following a particular non-
Ricardian policy is also falsiﬁable. Consider, for in-
stance, our example non-Ricardian policy in which the
government follows the same tax and spending policy
regardless of the price sequence. Leeper (1991) calls this
a passive policy. We interpret the empirical exercises in
papers such as Cochrane 1999 as examining the implica-
tions of this kind of policy.
We can see this by examining the general form of
equation (55) (the present value of the stream of real
government surpluses must equal the real government
debt) and considering two alternative policies. In one,
the government taxes g + ε in every period, as in our
example economy. In the other, the government taxes
g +2 ε in period t = 0 (in which case, B0 = R−1B−1 −
2εP0)a n dg+ε in every subsequent period. If taxes are
ε in period 0, then equation (55) is unchanged. If taxes
are 2ε, then equation (55) becomes
(56) R−1B−1/P0 = ε +[ ε/(1−β)]
which solves for a lower P0. Thus, the above policy ap-
pears to predict that if taxes are increased, current prices
go down. This prediction would extend to a more formalversion of our example with stochastic policy—taxes
would be negatively correlated with prices.
Suppose, then, that we observe a systematic negative
correlation between taxes and prices. Is this evidence
that the government is using a non-Ricardian policy, and
so the ﬁscal theory of the price level is at work? It is true
that under a Ricardian policy, the set of equilibrium price
paths is unaffected by taxes. However, only one element
of this set actually occurs in equilibrium. It is certainly
possible that while the set is unchanged, the selection of
an equilibrium price path from that set is based on gov-
ernment tax policy, creating a negative correlation be-
tween taxes and prices. Thus, such a negative correlation
is not evidence against the government’s using a Ricar-
dian policy. As we argued above, the only way to know
if the government is using a non-Ricardian policy is to
know whether the government’s budget constraint is sat-
isﬁed for unobserved prices. This is impossible.
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A Concluding Example
We have argued that the ﬁscal theory of the price level
is, at its core, a device for selecting equilibria from the
continuum which can exist in monetary models. We can
contrast this equilibrium selection device with another,
more traditional, selection device. This alternative mone-
tarist selection device rules out equilibria with purely
speculative time trends in velocity. (For examples in
which technology and the money supply are constant,
the monetarist device implies a constant price level.) For
general speciﬁcations of initial debt, the monetarist se-
lection device conﬂicts with the ﬁscal theory device.
The following example, we believe, questions the plau-
sibility of the ﬁscal theory device.
Consider the following. An outside observer of the
economy sees the stationary price path and government
actions consistent with equilibrium and our example non-
Ricardian policy. That is, the observer’s data on the econ-
omy for periods t =0 ,1 ,2 ,. . .( T−1) are
(57) Pt = P0 = [(1−β)/β]M−1/y
(58) τt = g + ε, ε >0
(59) Rt =1 / β
(60) Bt = Rt−1Bt−1 − εPt
(61) Mt = M−1.
As we stressed earlier, the outside observer could have
(at least) two explanations for these data. One is that the
government is using our example non-Ricardian policy.
The other is that the government is using some Ricardian
policy, and the stationary equilibrium is being selected
from the set of possible equilibria.
Next suppose that in period T, the government sur-
prisingly conﬁscates a fraction x of the money supply.
(In our notation, this fraction is bought using an increase
in period T lump-sum taxes.) The government then cred-
ibly commits to using the same policy Π as before, with
the one change that the money supply stays ﬁxed at its
new low level.
However, the outside observer does not know wheth-
er the policy Π is Ricardian or not. Suppose ﬁrst that Π
is Ricardian and that the monetarist selection device is at
work. Then, in period T and thereafter
(62) Pt = P
** ≡ [(1−β)/β][(1−x)M−1/y].
Prices fall by the same fraction x as the money supply
and then stay constant. Of course, because this price fall
implies an increase in the real value of the government
debt, the government’s taxes must rise at some point in
the future to satisfy the government’s budget constraint.
In contrast, suppose that Π is our example non-
Ricardian policy. Then, if we consider period T as period
0, equation (55) becomes
(63) RT−1BT−1/PT = ε/(1−β).
Neither the real present value of budget surpluses nor the
nominal debt is affected by this conﬁscation; thus, the
value for PT is unaffected. However, the stationary equi-
librium price has fallen to P
**. Because the initial price
level PT under the non-Ricardian policy is greater than
P
**, the result is hyperinﬂation.
Thus, the two equilibria selection devices produce
radically different consequences for this policy change of
a one-time decrease in the money supply. The monetarist
device predicts a one-time decrease in the price level,
equal in percentage terms to the decrease in the money
supply. Given our example policy, the ﬁscal theory de-
vice predicts a speculative hyperinﬂation. Which predic-
tion seems more plausible? You decide.
Conclusion
Economists have known for some time that, in general,
monetary model economies have a large number of equi-
librium price paths. We have argued that the traditional,
and often unstated, selection device (which we call mon-
etarist) rules out equilibria with purely speculative time
trends in velocity. The ﬁscal theory of the price level is
an alternative selection device. The key force behind the
ﬁscal theory is that a government is fundamentally dif-
ferent from households. Households need to satisfy their
budget constraint for all prices, regardless of whether or
not those prices are equilibria. A government does not.
Further, a government’s pledge not to satisfy its budget
constraint for a price path is, mechanically, a rejection by
the government of that price path as an equilibrium.
These selection devices will be in conﬂict unless, of
course, governments choose only equilibria which the
monetarist device would have chosen anyway.
More fundamentally, the ﬁscal theory is about the
behavior of the government for unobserved prices. As
we have pointed out, it is therefore impossible to decide,
using data from a particular equilibrium, whether the
ﬁscal theory has served to select that equilibrium. This
makes the broad question of whether governments can
follow non-Ricardian policies a fundamentally religious,
not scientiﬁc, issue.
For our example policy of constant taxes and constant
money, we show that the ﬁscal theory predicts a specula-
tive hyperinﬂation in response to a once-and-for-all de-
crease in the money supply. In contrast, the standard
monetarist selection device predicts a once-and-for-all
decrease in the price level. To take the ﬁscal theory
seriously, we must believe that a government could ac-tually choose the hyperinﬂation outcome by following
our example policy. One cannot “believe in” the ﬁscal
theory device and the monetarist device simultaneously.
We choose to believe in the latter.
*The authors’ understanding of the issues in this paper has beneﬁted greatly
from discussions with Larry Jones. The authors also wish to thank V. V. Chari, John
Cochrane, Harold Cole, and Warren Weber for helpful comments and Kathy Rolfe
and Jenni Schoppers for expert editorial advice.
1See Leeper 1991, Sims 1994, McCallum 1998, Buiter 1999, and Cochrane
1999 for other discussions of the ﬁscal theory.
2This analysis is close to that of McCallum (1998).
3In fact, there are two stationary equilibria, but the second does not ﬁt our choice
of numeraire. If the price of money in terms of consumption is zero in all periods (or
money is worthless), then all households receive no utility from holding money and
thus are unwilling to pay a positive price to hold it.
4Putting the endowment y in the utility function for money guarantees that
v′(M/P)/u′(y) < 1 for all M/P > 0. This ensures that prices never become negative.
5This is Walras’ law. If the budget constraint holds with equality for all but one
agent in the economy and markets clear, the budget constraint holds with equality for
the last agent.
6Perhaps we should particularly note that this non-Ricardian policy eliminates
the worthless-money equilibrium described in footnote 3. This implies that a non-
Ricardian policy can “cause” money to have value. In this example, money has to
have value so that the government surpluses have a real debt to pay off.
7That allowing non-Ricardian policies is equivalent to allowing governments to
simply reject price vectors as equilibria is not speciﬁc to the example economy pre-
sented here. This equivalence holds for any economy in which household optimiza-
tion implies that the household’s budget constraint is satisﬁed with equality.
8Another reason for a negative correlation between taxes and prices is pointed
out by Sargent and Wallace (1985). They argue that a decrease in the government’s
debt today lowers the likelihood of increases in the money supply in the future.
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